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PROMISE VS. PERFORMANCE: WHY PUBUC SUBSIDIES 
OF PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT ARE NOT LIKELY 
TO PRODUCE FAIR RETURNS TO 
THE TAXPAYING PUBLIC 
By Marc Knapp 
I. Introduction 
On September 10, 2013, the Baltimore City Council gave tinal ap-
proval to Harbor Point, a $1 billion multi-use project to be built on a 
vacant, remediated brownfield that juts into Baltimore's Inner Har-
bor. I Like many urban development or redevelopment projects, Har-
bor Point will be supported by significant taxpayer subsidies. Between 
a $107 million direct investment in project-related infrastructure -
largely parks that will surround the to-be-built offices, shops and resi-
dences, and a waterfront promenade2 - along with a mixed bag of real 
estate and income tax incentives,~ the visible public support to Harbor 
Point will exceed $200 million,4 20% of projected total investment. As 
with all such projects, Harbor Point's pre-approval advocacy was rife 
with promises of jobs, revitalization, and eventual increased tax 
revenues. 5 
This paper examines the gap between promise and performance 
when it comes to taxpayer financed subsidies of private development 
projects,6 with a focus on the ways that taxpayer financing subsidies 
are rationalized by elected officials and sold to the public.7 If there is 
a promise or performance gap that we, might wish to close as planners 
and taxpayers, we must understand its root causes. 
l. Pat Warren, BallimfYfe City Council Approves $1OUM j()r Harbor Point Develop--
ment, CBS BALTIMORE. (Sept. 10, 2013), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/ 
2013/09/10/balt-city-council-approves-100m-for-harbor-point-develop-
ment/. 
2. Gerald Neily, Harbor Point: Do we mally nel!d $80 million in bells and whi~tWs?, 
BALTIMORE BREW Gune 7, 2013), hups:/ /www.baltimorebrew.com/20l3/ 
06/071 har bor-poin t -do-we-really-need-8O-mi llion-in-bells-and-whistles/ . 
3. See id. 
4. Natalie Sherman, Lead(Jrs Celebrate Harbor Point Croundbreaking, THE BAL TI· 
MORE SUN (Feb 25, 2013), http://www.ba1tirnoresun.com/business/real-es-
tate/wonk/bs-bz-harbor-point-groundbreaking-20150225-story.htm!' 
5. Neily, supra note 2. 
6. Tim Pula, The HarbfYf Point TIF Makes Sense, THE BALTIMORE SUN (July 1, 
2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/ 20 13-07-0 1/ news/bs-ed-harbor-
point-tif-2013070 l_l_tax-abatement-tax-rebate-tifs. 
7. See irifm Part V.d. 
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II. Is There a Promise or Perlormance Gap when Private Develop-
ment Is Subsidized by Public Money? 
Generally speaking, to quality for direct public financing subsidies 
(i.e. debt issued by a state or municipality to support a project as op-
posed to tax credits or abatements), the private project in question 
must have some nexus to a public purpose or benefit.s Universally-
asserted benefits are jobs and neighborhood revitalization that will 
lead to future increased tax revenues. 
The public benefit requirement presents an opportunity for misdi-
rection by the politicians, bureaucrats, labor leaders, and developers 
who advocate in favor of specific projects.9 It is easy to assert a benefit 
that the public wants to believe in like lower taxes or jobs, easier than 
it is to argue against.!O This results in vague and non-quantified 
claims being set forth, for example "high paying jobs" instead of "X 
number of jobs with a median salary of Y." Vagueness is a boon for 
subsidy advocates - how can you hold them accountable for a shortfall 
if they never said how much in the first place and a bane for academi-
cians - how can you conduct a promise or performance shortfall study 
if the promise was never spelled out? The result is a scarcity of studies 
dealing with the efficacy of private activity finance insofar as realiza-
tion of public objectives is concerned. Lynne Sagalyn opined that 
"not even [general principals of good public/private development] 
exist. We lack systematic evaluation of actual practice."11 
Notwithstanding a dearth of studies, a number of sources have criti-
cized private activity finance. 12 An in-depth exploration of such criti-
cism is beyond the scope of this article. SufIice it to say that the thrust 
of the most common objections to private activity financial subsidies 
are the adverse impact of locally approved subsidies on federal tax 
revenues and the general immorality of corporate welfare. 13 Little has 
been written about the life-of-project costs of such subsidies that are 
incurred by state and local taxpayers. It is as if many commentators 
view private activity subsidies as cost-free - many commentators, but 
not all. 14 
8. See IRS PUBLICATION 5005 (4-2012). 
9. See infra Part V.e. 
ID. Neily, mpra note 2. 
11. Lynne B .. Sagalyn, Public/Private, DeueloptMnt: Lessons from Hi~t(}ry, &search, 
and PractIce, 73 J. AM. PlAN. Ass N 7 (2007). 
12. See Government. Accountability Office, Limiting the Tax-Exempt Status oj' Cer-
tain Governmental Bonds Could Yield, GAO-OS-364 (200S), available at http:/ / 
www.gao.gov/modules/ereport/handler.php?I=I&path=/ereport/GAO-
11-31SSP /data_center_savings/General~overnment/Limiting_the_tax­
exempcstatus_oCcertain~overnmentaLbonds_could_yield_revenue. 
13. David Brunori, VVlwe is the Outrage Over Corporate Welfare?, FOIlliES (Mar. 14, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2014/03/I4/where-is-the-
outrage-over-corporate-welfare / . 
14. Mary Williams Walsh & Louise Story, A Stealth Tax Subsidy for Business Faces 
New Scrutiny, NY TIMES (March 4, 2013), hup:/ /www.nytirnes.com/2013/ 
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Mary Wash and Louise Story writing in The New York Times charac-
terized private activity financings as a "stealth tax" .15 They cited sev-
eral instances of apparent abuse: a winery in North Carolina, a golf 
course in Puerto Rico, a Corvette museum in Kentucky, and the cor-
porate offices of Goldman Sachs and Bank of America in Manhat-
tan. Hi The problem with these projects, according to Wash and Story, 
is that they will not yield enough incremental revenue for the munici-
pal debt issuers that financed them to enable those issuers to service 
the debt they issued in support of these project~ without tapping into 
other sources - e.g. diverting taxes from other uses.17 
Camden Yards (home of the Baltimore Orioles) and M&T Bank Sta-
dium (where the Baltimore Ravens play) are stealth tax examples in 
close proximity to Harbor Point. These stadia are publically owned 
and were buill at a total cost that exceeded $600 million. It-! According 
to financial statements filed by the Maryland Stadium Authority (the 
operator of these stadia), the Authority runs a deficit (and has done 
so for years) that requires a $20 million annual cash infusion from 
out"ide sources (i.e. Maryland taxpayers) to remain solvenL IY 
Whatever was promised when dlese stadia were built, it is safe to say 
that the promise was not "$600 million down and $20 million per year 
thereafter." From a dollars and cents taxpayer perspective, these sta-
dia are terrible deals. If we assume that Baltimore's municipal invest-
ments should return at least 5% annually,20 Camden Yards and M&T 
03/05/ business/ qualified-private-ac tivi ty-honds-come-unde r-new-sc ru ti n y 
.htm1?pagewanted~all&J~O. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Jd. Besides the financing cost subsidy, subsidized projects often benefit by 
being eligible for tax-rree equipment purchases and abated real estate 
taxes. 'd. These subsidies are tax expenditures that reduce what otherwise 
would have been received by the debt-issuing municipalities. !d. Hence they 
are an actual cost to local taxpayers who must replace the funds. ld. 
18. KATE DAVIS & CIIAUNA BROCHT WITH PHIL MAITF.RA & CRF.G LERoy, GOOD 
JOBS FIRST, SUBSmnlNG THF. Low Ro/m: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TN BALTI· 
MORE 39-55 (2002), available at hup:! /www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/de-
fault/ tiles/ docs/ pdf/baIt. pdf. At $600 million for two stadiums, Maryland 
taxpayers got a bargain. Jd. Washington, DC paid the same for just one 
stadium, Nationals Park. See David Cranor, Was National5 Pa.rk Worth it far 
DC?, GREATER GREATER WASHINGTON (Aug. 27, 2013) http://greater-
greaterwashington.org/ post/19849 / was-nationals-park-worth-it-for-dc/. 
19. See MARYLAND STADIUM AUTHOIUn', 2011 ANNUAL REpORT, 54-57 (2011), 
available at http://www.mdstad.com/pdf/msa-2011·annual-report.pdf; MA-
RYlAND STADIUM AUTHORIty, 2012 ANNUAl. REPORT 43-45 (20J2), availahle at 
hup:/ /www.mdstad.com/pdf!msa-2012-annual-report.pdf; MARYLANl) STA-
DIUM AUTHORIty, 2013 ANNUAL REpORT 10-13 (2013), availahle at http:/ / 
www.rndstad.com/pdf! msa-20 13-an nual-re port. pdf. 
20. An taxpayer-funded investments must generate a return. Investments in ed-
ucation should return educated children. Investment in police should re-
turn safer streets. And investments in commercial enterprises (such as 
sports stadiums) should return cash. See Adam M. Zaretsky, Should Cities Pay 
Jor Sport Facilities?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (April 200l), hups:/ / 
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Bank Stadium combined are short of target by $50 million without any 
consideration for recoupment of initial principle. ~1 Apologists might 
say that the direct cash shortfall is covered by ancillary economic activ-
ity such as increases in sales taxes and employment. But if the current 
$50 million annual shortiaJI (assuming a modest 5% return and for-
getting the need to recoup the invested principle) were to be covered 
entirely by sales taxes, given Maryland's 6% sales tax rate, incremental 
annual sales would have to exceed $800 million.22 To say that these 
incremental sales are taking place in dose proximity to the stadia is 
simply not supportable by fact. There are only 25 or so bars and res-
taurants - the principal businesses (along with parking) that benefit 
from game-day spending - within reasonable walking distance of Cam-
den Yards and none within reasonable walking distance of M&T Bank 
Stadium. 23 These 25 bars and restaurants are obviously not selling 
$800 million dollars worth of more beer and burgers each year.24 To 
say that direct job growth is what makes up for the cash return 
shortfall is likewise not supportable by fact. The bulk of the stadium 
jobs are low wage 25 - food and souvenir vendors, and cleaners - and 
part time - the Orioles play 81 games a year at home and the Ravens 
play just ten. To say that parking taxes are filling the void is likewise a 
stretch. If every game were a sell-out and every attendee drove his or 
her own car, per game parking fees would have to equal $45 (which is 
higher than is actually the case in downtown Baltimore).26 A more 
realistic assumption of the ratio of parked cars to parked bottoms in 
2l. 
22. 
23 . 
24. 
25. 
26. 
www.stlouisfed.org/Publicatiolls/Regional-Economist/ April-2001/Should-
Cities-Pay-for-Sports-Facilities. 
$600,000,000 (total'public investment in Camden Yards and M&T Bank Sta-
dium) * 5% '" $30,000,000 (target annual return on investment). 
$30,000,000 (not realized) plus $20,000,000 (annual public contribution to 
cover deficit) = $50,000,000 (total nct shortfall). 
$833,333,333 (total taxable sales) * 6% (Maryland sales tax rate) '" 
$50,000,000. 
Restaurants near M&T Bank Stadium, COOGLE MAFs, https:/ /www.google 
. com/maps (search for M&T Bank Stadium; click on "nearby restaurants" 
hyperlink) . 
At $2.1') per person, the 25 bars/restaurants near Camden Yards would have 
to average more than 1 1/4 million incremenLal meals each - roughly 16,000 
each Orioles home game - to get over $800 million in additional sales. 
[$25/mcal * 25 (bars) * 1,333,333 (meals/bar) '" $833,333,333 (taxable 
sales revenues); 1,333,333 meals spread over 81 regular season home games 
= 16,460 meals per home game]. 
See Charlie Vascellaro, The Vendors oJ Camden Yards, BALTIMORE STYLE Guly/ 
Aug. ~OlO), available at htlp:/ /www.baltimorestyle.com/index.php/style/ 
people/peoplc_camdcn_yardsjalO/. Vendors al Camden Yards work on 
tips and commissions only. Good ones average $200 to $300 per game. /d. 
At $250 per game, 81 home games and a good season for the Orioles, a 
good vendor will make roughly $20,000 a year. All Pro Vending supplies the 
vendors for M&T Bank Stadium. Irl. The base commission for M&T Bank 
Stadium vendors is 12%. Id. 
See Baltimore Parking, BALTIMORE BEST PARKING http://baltimore.bestpark 
ing.com/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
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stadium seats, would push the needed parking fee to over $100, and at 
that price, few game-goers would drive. 27 So, although there are no 
definitive fact.o;; in support of this conclusion, I can say with certainty 
that Baltimore's stadia have been money losers for Maryland 
taxpayers. 
III. What Is a "TIF" and How Does It Differ from Other Forms of 
Municipal Debt? 
Since half the visible subsidy for Harbor Point will come from a 
$107 million TIF28 (UTax Increment Financing"), the proceeds of 
which will fund pre-development infrastructure, it is important to un-
derstand what a TIF is, how it differs from other instruments of mu-
nicipal finance, and how the concept was sold to the public. 
Typically, a tax increment financing project works as follows. 
When the project is begun, the assessed value of the project 
area is frozen for purposes of determining how much tax rev-
enue each municipal taxing entity will receive from the area 
during the first phase. Usually the city must expend money 
to acquire and clear land or otherwise improve property 
within the project area in order to make it more attractive to 
private developers. Until these cost.'i incurred by the munici-
pality are repaid through increased tax revenue due to in-
creased property values after redevelopment, the city and all 
other taxing entities will continue to receive tax revenue 
based on the frozen valuation (the tax base), whether the 
actual value of the property in the pr~ject area declines, as it 
sometimes does initiaUy, or increases due to redevelopment 
activity. Property owners in the area pay the full amount of 
tax due on the actual value of the property, and after the 
property value has risen above the initial assessed value, the 
increased tax revenue is put into a special fund which is used 
by the municipality to pay its development cost~. When all 
the city's costs have been paid, including payments on 
bonds, the area's valuation is unfrozen and all taxing districts 
benefit from the increa<;e in property values.29 
TIFs are not new. They have been around for more than 50 years,30 
and are widely used throughout the U.S.!!l TIl's are especially valua-
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
If eaeh car held two people, the break-even parking fee doubles to $90. At 
three people per car, the required parking fee triples to $1 :15. 
Baltimore Dev. Corp., Harbor Point Tax Inrrement Financin[; Fact and Informa-
tion Sheet, BALTIMORE DEV. CORP. Ullne 3, 2013), http://baltimoredevclop-
ment.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/harbor-pointfact-sheet.pdf. 
Christina G. Dudley, Tax Increment Finandng far Redevelopment in Missour-i: 
Beauty and the Beast, 54 UMKC L. REV. 77 (1985). 
See id. 
Tax Increment Financing, WIKlPEDlA, http://en.wikipcdia.org/wiki/Tax_in 
c['ement_financing (last visited Feb. 11,2015). 
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ble when it comes to big-ticket subsidies. Unlike other municipal pro-
ject finance structures, TIF issuance caps, individually and in the 
aggregate, are locally set.32 This means that only the issuers' common 
sense provides a brake on TIF issuance. 33 Also, on the surface, TIFs 
appear to the uninitiated (i.e. the taxpayer) to be revenue bonds with 
dedicated sources of debt service and hence, have with no claim 
against the municipal treasuries.34 But unlike true revenue bonds, if 
the dedicated revenue source for a TIF falls short of debt servicing 
needs, the issuers are obligated to service the TIF using general reve-
nues.3!:i TIFs, therefore, are general obligation bonds (GOs) disguised 
as revenue bonds. 
There is a specific issue that affects TIFs that does not affect other 
instruments of municipal finance. As noted, to make them look like 
revenue bonds, TIFs are structured so as to dedicate incremental, pro-
ject-produced tax revenues to their service.1$6 Until TIFs are paid off, 
the issuing municipalities realize no net tax benefits from TIF-fi-
nanced prqjects.37 The delayed-benefits aspect of TIFs can cause 
problems, potentially major problems, that do not attach to other 
forms of municipal finance. 
Suppose, for example, that the pre-development real estate taxes 
generated by a TIF-eligibJe, blighted part of town are $1,000 per year, 
and the cost of providing public services (police, fire, road mainte-
nance, teachers' salaries, pensions, healthcarc benefits to employees 
and retirees, etc.) to that area arc $2,000. This means that in Year-I, 
other sections of that municipality must subsidize the blighted area to 
the tune of $1,000. Over a ten year period, assuming no inflation, the 
aggregate subsidy will come to $10,000. But there is always inflation. 
Assuming a modest 2% annual inflation rate that impacts both reve-
nues and public service costs equally, the annual subsidy would grow 
from $1,000 in Year-1 to $1,195 in Year-10, and the ten year aggregate 
subsidy would climb from $10,000 to $10,950.?'8 
32. See Berwyn Dev. Corp., TIF Frequently Asked"QT~estions, BERWYN DEV. CORP. 
http://www.berwyn.net/tif-frequently-a~ked-questions (last visited Feb. 24, 
2015). 
33. See £d. With local control of TIFs they are generally only subject to the com-
mon sense of the locality. Id. 
34. See, e.g., LR.C. § 146 (2014); IRS PUBLICATION 4079 (REv. 9-2005), CATALOG 
No. 34663R, Tax·Exempt Governmental Bonds, 4-5; IRS PUBI.lCATION 5005 (4-
2012), CATAl.OG No. 59471F, Your Responsibilities As a Conduit Issuer of Tax-
Exempt Bonds, 5-6. Revenue bonds are serviced outside the issuer's general 
tax revenue stream, and are subject to federally-imposed issuance caps. GO 
issuance is limited by state and local ordinances. TIFs, thus, can be issued 
for very large amounts. Id. 
35. See Berwyn Dev. Corp., supra note 32. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. 
:18. See infra Table I .. 
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The $10,950 aggregate subsidy is what would be the case if there 
were no TIF. With a T1F, the municipality's general fund's share of 
real estate taxes from the blighted area is locked at $1,000 per year 
until the TIF is retired.39 This means that the Year-I 0 subsidies from 
other parts of the city (keeping our other assumptions unchanged 
and assuming the TIF will be outstanding for at least ten years) will 
rise from $1,195 to $1,390,40 and the aggregate shortfall will rise from 
$10,950 to $11,900.41 
But that is not all. A revitalized urban area will likely demand a 
higher level of municipal services than did a blighted area.42 Sup-
pose, for example, that the municipal service burden was to double. 
This will drive the cumulative ten-year shortfall that must be met ei-
ther by additional debt or by subsidies from other parts of the city to 
$33,800,4~ triple what it would have been had there not been a TlF 
issued for the blighted area's redevelopment. 44 
The numbers I have used are by way of example only. Although 
every case is different, the principle holds. TlFs have hidden costs 
and risks not presented by other forms of municipal financing struc-
tures. By dedicating a project's incremental revenues to paying for 
the public's investment in a TIF-financed project, we inevitably, in the 
short run, increa"e the tax burden on, or reduce the amount of 
money available to, other areas of the TIF-issuing municipality.4."> 
Since a big-ticket TIF may be outstanding for a fairly long time (the 
Harbor Point TIF finally matures in 2049) the "short run" may not be 
so short.46 A municipality that goes overboard issuing TIFs without 
considering this spillover effect could conceivably find itself bankrupt 
before it realized any of the delayed benefits from its redevelopment 
activities no matter how successfully its TIF-financed projects were tu 
39. See Berwyn Dev. Corp., supm note 32. 
40. See infra Table 2. 
41. See infra Table 2. 
42. JOHN CONLFY & MANFRED DIX, BENEFICIAL INEQUALlTY IN THE PROVISION OF 
MUNICIPAL SERVICES 6-7 (2002). 
43. See infra Table 3. 
44. Compare infra Table 1, with Table 3. 
45. See Dudley, supra note 29, at I; Walsh & Story, supra note 14 (if a project is 
funded by a GO, although the total costs may be the same as with a TIF, the 
issuer's flexibility is greatly increased. Also, the budgetary impact of a GO is 
far more transparent than is the case with a TIF). 
46. MuniCap, Inc., Baltimore Harbor 71F - Projection No. 3D-B, BALTIMORE DEV. 
CORP. (May 17, 2013), hup:/ /baltimoredevelopment.com!wp-content! 
u ploads/20 14 / 08/harbor-point-bond-projcction. pdf. 
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turn out. 47 TIFs, in other words, exemplifY The New York Times' con-
cept of a "stealth tax".48 
N. Maryland's New TIF Legislation - A Primer on How Private Ac-
tivity Finance Is Sold to the Public 
Maryland has new TIF legislation - HB 613 that was enacted in 
2013.49 The bill's introductory paragraph, in particular, is worthy of 
repeating: 
AN ACT concerning Sustainable Communities - Designation 
and Financing 
FOR the purpose of authorizing municipalities and certain 
counties to finance the cost of certain infrastructure im-
provements in a sustainable community in the same manner as 
a transit-oriented development under certain circum-
stances; authorizing a political subdivision to use certain al-
ternative local tax revenues for tax increment financing in 
connection with a sustainable community under certain cir-
cumstances; providing that bonds can be used for certain 
purposes in sustainable communities under certain circum-
stances; authorizing a political subdivision to determine a 
certain base of a certain brownfields site in a sustainable com-
munity under certain circumstances; authorizjng a political 
subdivision to pledge tax increment revenue to secure the 
payment of obligations to the Maryland Economic Develop~ 
ment Corporation for infrastructure improvements located 
in a sustainable community; providing for the construction of 
this Act; providing that certain political subdivisions will get 
priority for State funding under certain circumstances; defin-
ing and altering certain terms; providing that the Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore City may use certain authority 
granted under State law to a political subdivision for tax in-
47. A municipality that issues TIFs realizes no benefit from increased taxes 
from the redeveloped blighted area as these incremental taxes must be 
used to service the TIF. Until the TIF is fully paid orf, other sections of the 
city must subsidize the increased municipal services costs of the 
redeveloped blighted area. 
48. See Walsh & Story, supra note 14. For a further discussion of this TlF.specific 
problem See Redevelopment: The unknown government, MUNIC1PAI. OFFICIAI.S 
FOR REDEVELOPMENT REFORM (Sept. 2002), http://www.coalitionfor-
redeve lop men treform.org/ references/ morrreport. ph p. Since this problem 
has been known for over a decade, one might wonder why it has not been 
more widely publicized. The answer, I suspect, is politics. Our elected offi-
cials are more motivated by the short term benefits they realb:e from devel-
opment project~ - improved reelection chances - than they are deterred by 
problems that might not surface for decades, long after they have retired or 
moved on to other office. 
49. RB. 613, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
2014] Promise vs. Performance 
crement financing in a sustainahle community for certain pur-
poses; ... and generally relating to sustainable communities.50 
67 
Since the phrases "sustainable community" and "sustainable com-
munities" appear eight times in the introduction to HB 613, one 
might reasonably conclude that sustainable communities are central 
to Maryland's TIY program.51 If the Maryland TlF legislation is "Son 
of Sustainable Communities", it is important that we know the defini-
tion of a sustainable community. 
Su:;tainable communities are defined by the Sustainable Communi-
ties Act of 201052 (SB 285, an extension of the earlier Heritage Tax 
Credit program), and the means for designating one is codified in 
MD Housing & Community Development § 6-205.1>". 
Since its code is less than understandable to lay persons, to explain 
5B 285 to the public, Maryland published a pamphlet titled Sustainahle 
Community Act of 2010. 
No program in Maryland has been as successful at revitalizing ex-
isting buildings as the Heritage Structure Tax Credi{>4. It is a model 
of sustainable development and of public/private partnership. Every 
dollar of State rehabilitation tax credits generates $8.53 in economic 
activity and each million dollars in rehabilitation tax credits gener-
ates 72.5 jobs, 
[according to] an Abell Foundation report. ... A rating sys-
tem will be established and only the best projects will be funded. 55 
Credit certificates will be granted only to exceptional projects 
that score high enough to warrant funding based on criteria 
developed in conjunction with the Governor's Smart Growth 
Subcabinet.56 
What, by the way, is a "sustainable community"? 
50. !d. (emphasis added). 
51. Id. 
52. MD. CODE ANN., Hous. & CMTV. DEV. § 6-201(1) (West 2014) 
(<<[S]uslainable community" means the part of a priority funding area that: 
(1) as detennined by the smart Growth Subcabinet, satisfies the require-
ments of § 6-205 of this subtitle; (2) has been designated as a BRAC Revi-
talization and Incentive Zone under title 5 subtitfe 13 of the Economic 
Development Article; or has been designated a lransit-oriented develop-
ment under § 7-101 of the Transportation article). 
53. MD. CODE ANN., HOl)s. & CMTV. DEV. § 6-205 (West 2014) 
54. The credits that developers received under the Sustainable Communities 
and Heritage Structures programs were against state and local income 
taxes, and were realizable when prqjects were completed. Smart, Oreen, and 
Growing-The Sustainabw Communities Act of 2010, H.B. 475, 20 to Leg., 
487th Sess. (Md. 2010). 
55. The Su.Hainabie Communities Act of 2010, MD. DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING 3 
Van. 2010), available (tt http://planning.maryland.gov/PDF /YourPart/Sus-
tainableCommllnities/SustainableCommunitiesAct2010.pdf [hereinafter 
Sustainabw Communities Act pamphlet] (emphasis added). 
56. /d. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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They share a common purpose: places where people thrive to en-
joy good health and create a high quality of life. A sustainable 
community reflects the interdependence of economic, envi-
ronmental, and social issues by acknowledging that regions, 
cities, towns and rural lands must continue into the future 
without diminishing the land, water, air, natural and cultural 
resources that support them. Housing, transportation and re-
source conservation are managed in ways that retain the economic, 
ecological and scenic values of the environment. And they are com-
munities where the consumption of fossil fuels, emissions ?/ green-
house gases, water resources and pollution are minimized.5 
To designate an area as a "sustainable community": 
(a) The Smart Growth Subcabinet, on the recommendation 
of the Secretary, may designate an area as a sustainable com-
munity if the sponsor demonstrates that past and current 
trends in homeownership, property values, commercial and 
residential vacancy, and business or housing investment 
show a need for reinvestment in the area and if: 
(I) entities in the community, such as local governments, em-
ployers, educational institutions, civic organizations, commu-
nity organizations, or cultural organizations, support the 
proposed sustainable community plan and have pledged re-
sources to develop or implement it; 
(2) the proposed sustainable community plan addresses the 
need for reinvestment in the area and will enhance the 
area, and give individuals of different incomes a range of 
housing options, employment opportunities, and other 
amenities; 
(3) a community in the proposed area is culturally or histori-
cally significant;-
(4) the proposed area is near a town center or a trans-
portation center; 
(5) the proposed sustainable community plan is consis-
tent with and complements other existing or proposed 
prqjects for housing, commercial or community develop-
ment, education, historic preservation, neighborhood 
revitalization, transportation, or other things significant 
to the comprehensive enhancement of the community; 
or 
(6) there is a demonstrated need for financing assis-
tance for small businesses, nonprofit organizations, or 
microen terprises. 51'\ 
The Sustainable Community Act pamphlet goes on to tout a series of 
projects across the State that have received Heritage Tax or Sustaina-
57. M at 7 (emphasis added). 
58. MD. CODE ANN., Hous. & eMlY. DEV. § 6-205 (West 2013). 
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ble Community credits.59 Two of the cited Baltimore projects are 
Druid Mill at 1500 Union Avenue and Stephanie Pezza's home at 643 
South Linwood Avenue. 5O 
Druid Mill (also known as Union Mill) is a National Historic Regis-
ter property that was converted from an industrial property to a mixed 
use, residential, retail, and commercial property in 2010 or 201l.61 
The projected project cost of the conversion was $20,000,000, and the 
awarded tax credit was $2,920,000. 62 Druid Mill is currently assessed 
at $8,487,000.63 If we assume that $7,500,000 of today's assessed value 
is attributable to the mill's rehabilitation funded in part by the Heri-
tage Tax redevelopment subsidy, it will take over sixteen years for the 
City and the State to recoup their tax credit investments in Druid Mill 
via incremental real estate tax receipts. 64 In plain tenus, Maryland 
taxpayers will be out of pocket for over 16 years because of Druid 
Mill's rehabilitation. 
As with Camden Yards and M&T Bank Stadium, there is an ancillary 
benefits argument that was put forth in defense of the public's invest-
ment in Druid Mill: the project will supposedly anchor the revitaliza-
tion of an entire neighborhood. 55 AJJ the photographs attached in 
Appendix I attest, this neighborhood revitalization has yet to be felt. 
643 South Linwood is a now-rehabilitated row-house in a neighbor-
hood of rehabilitated row-houses. 66 The house cost Ms. Pezza 
$440,000 in 2008.67 The 2010 rehab cost was $241,000 and the Heri-
tage Tax credit was $48,000.68 643 Linwood is currently assessed at 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15-32. 
See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15-16 (these 
projects are by way of example, I chose Baltimore projects only because 
Harbor Point is a Baltimore project). 
See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15. 
See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15. 
Real Property Data Search, STATE DEP'T OF AsSESSMENT AND TAX'N http:/ / 
sdat.resiusa.org/ReaIProperty /Pages/ defaulLaspx (choose "Baltimore 
City" in the county search box and "street address" in the search method 
box; then enter "1500" in the Slreet Number box and "Union" in the Slreet 
name box) (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
Baltimore real estate rates are currently 2.248% of assessed value, the state 
rate is 0.112% for a combined rate of 2.360%. 2.360% of $7,500,000 '" 
$177,000 per year in new tax revenue. $2,920,000 + $177,000 = 16.50 years 
without any consideration for the lime value of the $2,920,000 inveSled (in 
the form of a tax credit) up front. See Real Property, BALTIMORE DEp'T OF 
FIN., http://cityservices.baltimorecity.gov /realproperty / default.aspx 
(search term "Seawall" in the "Owner" search criteria box) (last visited Feb. 
J8,2015). 
See Sustainahle Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 15. 
See Sustainable Communities Act pamphkt, supra note 55, at 15. 
Real PropertJ Data Search, STATF. DEP'T OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION, http:! 
/sdat.resiusa.org/ReaIProperty/Pages/default.aspx (Iasl visited FEB. 18, 
2015) (choose "Baltimore City" in the county search box and "street ad-
dress" in the search method box; then enter "643" in the Street Number 
box and "South Linwood" in the street name box) (last visited Feb. ] 8, 
2015). 
See Sustainable Communities Act pamphlet, supra note 55, at 16. 
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$387,00069 (as opposed to the $700,000 or so that one might expect 
given the purchase price and renovation cost), which implies a nega-
tive return on the taxpayer's $48,000 investment. 70 Since it appears 
the entire neighborhood - dozens of houses - has been rehabbed, 
apparently without public assistance, it is hard to see why the Pezza 
property was singled out for Sustainable Communities' support. 7] 
These two cases may be outliers and may not represent the typical 
performance of Maryland's Heritage Structures / Sustainable Com-
munities programs. But these examples were chosen by the state to 
showcase these programs. 72 If these are among the best, and presum-
ably they are or why else would they have been cited, we can reasona-
bly conclude that Maryland's taxpayers were sold a bill of goods when 
the Sustainable Communities program was presented to them. It ex-
plains why nowhere in the rosy language used by the state to explain 
and extol the Sustainable Communities program is cost to the taxpay-
ers mentioned.1~ 
The disconnect between the Sustainable Communities' hype and its 
performance raises several key questions I shall address below: who 
benefits from public subsidies of private development and who foots 
the bill? 
As noted above,74 "sustainable communities" are mentioned eight 
times in the introduction to HB 613.75 There are seven further refer-
ences in the preamble.76 From this, one might reasonably conclude 
that HB 6] 3 is a Sustainable Communities' bill. Such a conclusion 
would, however, be incorrect. 
HB 613 authorizes municipalities to define special taxing districts?7 
that can issue TIFs to finance the costs of infrastructure projects in 
any defined area of the city78 - not just in the special taxing district as 
long as the project relates somehow to a special taxing district. 79 HB 
613 also dedicates revenues from the related special taxing district to 
service those bonds. 8o Special taxing district.~ need not be Sustainable 
Communities.S ! HB 613authorizes action in, or on behalf of, Sustain-
able Communities and/or "development district.<;" where "develop-
ment districts" are defined as any contiguous parcels of land 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
See Real Property Data Search, supra note 63. 
$440,000 (purchase price) + $241,000 (renovation expense) = $689,000 (es-
timated assessed value of rehabilitated house). $689,000 - $387,000 (actual 
assessed value) = $302,000 (assessed value deficit following renovation). 
Based on a tour of neighborhood. 
See Real Property Data Search, supra note 63. 
See S.B. 285, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010); see also H.B. 1327, 2012 Leg., 
(Md. 2012); see also Real Property Data Search, supra note 63. 
See supra text accompanying notes 51-59. 
See RH. 613, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2013). 
See id. 
Jd. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
See id. 
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designated as a development district by municipal resolution.~2 Being 
a Sustainable Community may be a sufficient condition when it comes 
to TIFs, but it is by no means a necessary condition.H~ As long as a TIF's 
proceeds are restricted to certain identified uses (property condemna-
tion and acquisition, relocation of existing occupiers, site clearance, 
street~ and sidewalks, utilities, parking g'<lrages, and parks and play-
grounds), a municipality can issue all the TIFs it wants, with or with-
out tics to Sustainable Communities, by enacting resolutions that 
carve out development and special taxing districts. 4 Hence, the Ma-
ryland government was disingenuous to say the least both in its por-
trayal of sustainable communities in 2010 and in its pretense that HB 
613 (and the TIFs authorized by HB 613) has something to do with 
them. 
Consistent with the observations I made above regarding the likeli-
hood that TIFs may exacerbate municipal cash flow problems in the 
short run,Hi> the Department of Legislative Services in its Fiscal and 
Policy Note to HB 613 noted that HB 613 will cause a "potential signif-
icant increase in annual debt service expenditures for local govern-
ments on bonds issued under the bill."86 Fiscal and Policy Notes are 
available to the public on the Maryland Assembly's web site, but it is 
unlikely they are widely read, much less widely understood.87 It is 
likely that Fiscal and Policy Notes will have less impact on public per-
ceptions of boondoggle-enabling legislation such as HB 613 than will 
the puffery of artfully crafted public relations pieces such as the Sus-
tainable Community Act of 2010 pamphlet. 
V. Who Benefits from Private Activity Finance Subsidies? 
To understand why there is a disconnect between the hype used to 
promote taxpayer development subsidies on a general level as well the 
subsidies granted to specific projects, we must identify subsidizations' 
winners and the losers. 
a. Developers 
Simply put, with taxpayer subsidies, developers make more money 
and incur less risk than they do when they undertake unsubsidized 
projects.88 Because of this, developers are likely to support politicians 
82. Id. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
85. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
86. DEP'T OF LEGTSLATfVE SERVICES, HB 613 Fiscal and Policy Note (Revised), at 
2 (2013 Sess.). 
87. General Assembly of Maryland, GENERAL AsSEMBLY OF MARYlAND, http:! I 
mgaleg.maryland.gov!webmga!frmlst.aspx?tab=home, (last visited Feb. 18, 
2015). 
88. See Mark Reutter, Beatty lavished funds on maYfff and City Council as thl!) lav-
ished tax credits on Harb()T Point, BALTIMORE BREW, March 18, 2014, https:/ I 
www.baltimorebrew.com/20 14/ 0 3/18 Ibeatty-la vished-funds-on-mayo r-and-
72 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 4 
who vote in favor of subsidies, and show their appreciation by making 
regular donations to election campaigns. As long as the "taxes"S9 lev-
ied on the developers by the politicians for their support are less than 
the subsidies' values to the developers, developers are incented to play 
the game.gO 
Michael Beatty, the Harbor Point developer is a case in point. 
Beatty's projected return on Harbor Point is 14%, versus the 10.7% he 
was expecting had there been no subsidies,91 and his risk of failure is 
reduced by the subsidies. If the early phases of the development do 
not pan out as projected, Beatty can, as a practical matter, stretch out 
the project's timetable or stop building entirely.9~ Should this hap-
pen and the incremental taxes generated by Harbor Point prove insuf-
t1cient to service its TIF, Baltimore's taxpayers will have to pony Up.93 
Beatty is generally understood to contribute to Baltimore Mayor Ste-
phanie Rawlings-Blake and her supporters on the City Counci1.94 
Since HB 613, along with § 5-338 of the Maryland Economic Develop-
ment Code and § 9-229 of the Maryland Tax Code (sections that deal 
with brownfields credits), seems to have been drafted with Harbor 
Point in mind, it is likely that Beatty also contributes to members of 
the Maryland Assembly.9;' To smooth the way with community groups, 
Beatty has agreed to contribute three million toward affordable hous-
city-council-as-they-Iavished-tax-credits.on-harbor-point!. The financial 
backing of the state taxpayers makes proje::cts less risky to developers. 
89. By "taxes" T mean lhe campaign contributions developers are expected to 
make and We non-project amenities such as parks and playgrounds they 
are expecte::d to pay for. S& generally id. 
90. Id. 
91. Luke Broadwater, City financing would enable Harbor Point developer to make 
$174 million, THE BALTlMORE SUN, June 26, 2013, available at http;! /arti-
des. bal timorcsun .com/20 13-06-26/ news/bs-md-ci-harbor-poin t-profit-
20 130626_1_harhor-poi n t-the-'bdc~baltimote-develbpmen t-corp/2. 
92. HB 613 does not impose penalties on developers who walk away from TlF-
funded projects. See H.B. 613, 2013 Leg., 433rd Sess. (Md. 2013). 
93. See Grmeral Obligation Bonds, MD. STATE TREASURER hup:/ /www.trea-
surer.state .md. us/ de btmanagemen t/ general-obligation-bonds.aspx (last 
visited Mar. I, 2015). If Baltimore is unable to service the Harbor Point TIF, 
a state bailout may be required. !d. Although there may be no legal require-
ment to bail out a failed TIF, failure to do so will adversely impact Mary-
land's bond rating and drive up the cost of future borrowings. [d. This is 
the reason that the federal government felt obligated to step in and guaran-
tee the debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. [d. 
94. Reutter, supra note 88; A Beattyocracy: Rushing through the corparate welfare like 
its [sic} nobody's business, BEYOND THE BARRICADE (Aug. 18,2013), https:// 
beyondbarricade. wordpress.com/20 13/08/18/ a-beattyocracy-rushing-
throu&h-corporate-welfare-like-its-nobodys-business/. Of course, most of 
Bealty s political contributions would be via PACs, through his business, 
and via other structures designed to circumvent campaign finance contri-
butions. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 883 
(2010) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976». 
95. Jess Blumberg, F.T AL., Power - Who has it. Who's lost it. And how to get it, 
BALTIMORE MAc. (Jan. 2011), http://www.baltimorcmagazine.net!20J 1/1/ 
power. 
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ing - housing that will have no direct relationship to Harbor Point - a 
contribution that is covered many times over by the Harbor Point sub-
sidies he will receive.96 
b. Labor 
Construction workers are obvious beneficiaries of subsidized devel-
opment - with more subsidies there is more development.~n The crea-
tion of construction jobs - particularly the assertion of high paid 
construction jobs for disadvantaged minorities - is frequently touted 
as a key justification for taxpayer subsidies of private development.9H 
But, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), skilled workers 
such as electricians and iron workers make roughly $25.00 an hour-
$50,000 a year. 99 If the justification for project subsidies is to help the 
most disadvantaged sections of the inner city, skilled construction 
worker jobs are not relevant. Persons who make $50,000 a year do not 
usually live in blighted inner city neighborhoods. loo Poor neighbor-
hoods may supply the unskilled labor needed for projects, but these 
jobs average less than $30,000 a year in Maryland10J which is above the 
poverty level,102 but not so high as to preclude the job-holders from 
still qualifying for public assistance. 103 
Skilled construction workers are often unionized, and labor unions 
contribute to political campaigns and get out to vote for favored can-
96. Luke Broadwater, Council committee approves aid Jor HarblJr Point, THE BALTl-
MORE SUN (Aug. 7, 2013), http://articles.baltirnoresun.com/2013-08-07 / 
news/bs-md-ci-harbor-point-committee-20 130807_1 _harbor-poin t-coun cil-
president-bernard-c-beat.ty. 
97. See, e.g., Baltimore Dev. Corp., supra note 28. 
98. See id. 
99. Occupational Employment in Wages - May 2013, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. 
(April 21, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdUocwage.pdf. 
100. The Initiative for a Competit.ive Inner City noted that the inner city poverty 
rate is 32%. Lena Ferguson, In America's War on Poverty, Inner Cities Remain 
the Front Lines, INITIATIVE FOR A COMPETrflVE INNER erIT (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://www.icic.org/connection/blog-entry/blog-in-americas-war-on-pov-
crty-inner-cities-rcmain-the-front-line. The federal government's 2014 pov-
erty line for a family of four is $23,850. See also, ObamaCare Subsidies, 
OBAMACARE FACTS, hUp:/ /obamacarefacts.com/obamacarc-subsidicsl (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
101. Occupational Employment in Wages - May 2013, supm note 99. 
102. The poverty level for a family of fOll r is $23,850 per year. 2014 Poverty Guide-
lines, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES (Jan. 22, 2014), http:// 
aspe. hhs .gov / pove rty / 14poverty .cfm. 
103. For example, the cutoff for SNAP assistance (i.e. food stamps) is 130% of 
the poverty guidelines - $31,000 for a family of four in 2014. Supplemental 
Nutritional Assistance Prog;ram (SNAP), U.S. DEP'T OF ACRIC:., http://www 
.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibllity. The Affordable Healthcare Act provides sub-
sidies for incomes up to 400% of the poverty guidelines and expanded 
Medicaid benefits are available for incomes up to $23,913 for a family of 
four. 2()14 Poverty Guidelines, supra note 102. 
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didates. 104 Hence, skilled constnlction workers benefit from develop-
ment subsidies and have the political muscle to encourage them. lor; 
One estimate holds that Harbor Point will create 7,000 construction 
jobs, many of them unionized and skilled. 106 
Post-completion job creation is often lumped in with construction 
work as an asserted benefit from development subsidies, but the 
claimed benefits fall far short of promise (if, of course, the high-pay 
promise had been actually spelled out). 107 Highly paid manufactur-
ing jobs may be hinted at, but these appear to be gone for good. loS 
Modern mixed-use projects may attract high quality white collar jobs, 
but these don't go to the inner cities' unemployed and under-em-
ployed who lack the requisite qualifications. l09 For the most part, 
post-completion jobs that benefit the inner cities are in retail and low-
skilled services where the pay is only about $10.00 an hour. no $10.00 
an hour service jobs reduce, but do not eliminate, the need for public 
assistance. 1 1 1 Families living on such wages still qualify for assistance 
benefits as SNAP, WIC, EITC and Medicaid. 1 12 
104. 14 of the top 25 political contributors for the period 1989 - 2014 are labor 
unions. Veronique de Rugy, Fourteen of America's 25 Biggest CamjJaign Donors 
Are Unions, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.nationalreview 
. com/ corner /372630/ fourtecn-americas-25-biggest -cam paign -donors-are-
unions-vcronique-de-mgy. 
lOS. See id. 
106. Broadwater, supm note 96. 
107. Baltimore Dev. Corp., supra note 28. The Baltimore Development Corp. 
estimated that Harbor Point, in addition to creating 7,175 constmction 
jobs, will create 6,611 direct and 2,547 indirect permanent post-construc-
tion jobs. Id. 
108. If not gone for good, then at least much fewer in 'number. See Patricia At-
kins et al., REsjJOnding to Manufacturing Job toss: Mat Can Economic Develop-
ment Policy Do?, BROOKINGS (June 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/-/ 
media/research/files/papers/2011/6/manufacturing%20job%2Oloss/ 
06_man ufacturingjob ~Ioss. pdf. 
109. In America:~ War On Poverty, Inner Cities Remain The Front Line, INTTIAT1VF. FOR 
A COMPETITIVE INNER CITY (February 3, 2014), http://www.icic.org/connec-
tion/blog-entry /blog-in-americas-war-on-povert y-in n er-ci ties-re main -the-
front-line; Governor Cuomo Signs Bill Creating Inner City Youth Employment Pro-
gram NEW YORK STATE (December 9, 2011), http://www.governor.ny.gov/ 
news/governor-cuomo-signs-bill-creating-inner-city-youth-employment-pro-
gram; and Newshour, Left Behind by the Recovery, 1nner City Teens Struggle to 
FindJobs, PUBLIC BROADCAST1NG SYSTEM Uuly, 5 2013), http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/bb/business-july-decl3-makingsense_07-05/, among many other 
reports, speak to the higher than overall un- and under-employment inner 
cities statistics, and the job training programs targeted at this problem. 
110. May 2013 National Occupational t-mployrnent and Wage Estimates United States, 
39-0000 Personal Care and Service Workers U.S. BUREAU OF u..BOR STATIST1CS 
(May 2013), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm#39-0000; May 
2013 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates United States, 41-
2000 REtail Sales Workers, U.S. BUREAU OF' LABOR STATISTICS http://www.bls 
.gov/oes/current/oes_llat.htm#4I-0000 (last visited Mar. I, 2015). 
111. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
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Baltimore's Inner Harbor development provides a model of what to 
expect from Harbor Point. According to a 2002 study by Kate Davis 
and Chauna Bracht: 
The downtown area has definitely seen an increase injobs. 
Between 1970 and 1995, employment downtown grew by 
80%. In fact, all of the city's net job growth since the 1970s 
has been in the downtown area, with the bulk of this in tour-
ism related jobs. .. [But the emphasis was on job quantity 
rather than job quality.] Typical tourism jobs - such as 
waiters, janitors, cashiers, and food service workers - pay 
about 46% of the average city wage. All but three of these job 
categories pay, on average, less than the federal poverty line 
for a family offour ($17,650 per year in 2001) ... These)obs 
are dead end with little potential for upward mobility.' 3 
That the bulk of post-completion jobs are often low-paid explains 
why supporters of development subsidies don't provide wage specific-
ity when they talk about the "high-paying" jobs their projects will cre-
ate. 1 14 And since retail and service sector jobs are generally not 
organized, there is no one or nothing to hold the job promisors' feet 
to the fire when the high-paying jobs fail to materialize. 115 
c. Neighbors 
"Revitalization" is word often used to justify development subsidies. 
It is a word applied to neighborhoods, and neighborhoods imply 
neighbors. The neighbors of subsidized developments do not univer-
sally see benefits from the subsidies. 116 
New, subsidized projects are apt to compete unfairly with their not 
so new neighbors. 117 Subsidized development<; that can match (if not 
LI3. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
117. 
See Davis & Brocht, supra note 18. 
Baltimore Development Corporation, supra note 107. For example, pro-
vides estimates on numbers of created jobs but is silent when it comes to 
pay levels. 
According to the BLS, the 2013 unionization rate for rctail workers was 
5.0%, for food sCIYice workers it was 1.8%, and for building maintenance 
workers it was 1l.3% with a weighted average unionization rate of 5.1 %. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Economic News Release, BUR£AU OF lAllOR STATIS-
TICS Qanuary 23,2015) http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm. 
2013 and 2014 saw widely-reported, industry-wide strikes by fast food work-
ers and Walmart employees. Id. There were, however, no reports of wage 
increases, working condition improvements or benefits gains resulting from 
these strikes. Id. 
The multi-year fight over the Atlantic Yards, Brooklyn NY redevelopment 
project is a case in point. Daniel Goldstein, What Is Atlantic Yards? A Com-
plete Failure of Democracy, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 201 0), http://www.huf-
fing ton pos t. com / dan iel-goldstcin/what-is-atlan tic-yards-a_b_ 497229. h tm 1. 
See Matthew Myers, Insights: Redefining the BaitimVTe CBD, CASSIDY TURLEY, 
available at http://dtz.cassidyturley.com/DesktopModulcs/CassidyTurley/ 
Download/Download .ashx?COI1len tId~2797 &fileName~Downtown +Officc+ 
Conversiol1+White+Papcr.pdf. 
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undercut) the rents offered by their older, unsubsidized neighbors 
are likely, in the short run, to put downward pressure on the neigh-
bors' rents, and lower rents may lead to deterioration. I IS If a redevel-
opment does in fact revitalize its surrounding neighborhood, 
revitalization benefits may be a long time coming.1l9 Also, when revi-
talization does occur, the resulting upward pressure on rents might 
price existing tenants out of the market. 120 Harbor Point exemplifies 
both the good and the bad from neighborhood landlord and tenant 
perspectives. 
Except for a strip along the waterfront on Pratt Street, downtown 
Baltimore is not home to upscale retail establishments or class A offlce 
buildings, which is characterized by high vacancies. 121 According to 
the Baltimore Business Journal: 
The downtown vacancy rate [is] between 17 and 18 per-
cent, and ... the total space absorbed was 97,000 square feet 
[in the second quarter of 2013], for a total of 186,000 square 
feet so far this year. The most competitive real estate contin-
ues to be near the Inner Harbor and at Harbor East, as Class 
B landlords continue to struggle with high vacancy.122 
Harbor Point is slated to add 1.8 million square feet of commercial 
space123 - five years' worth at current absorption rates - to an already 
weak market.124 Given its subsidies, Harbor Point will be able to offer 
class A space at class B rents should its developer choose to do 80. 12:; 
The opposition of the Downtown Management Association (repre-
senting 1,200 downtown landlords) to Harbor Point should have sur-
prised no one. 126 
118. Id. 
119. Id: 
120. GENTRIFICATION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT, THE: NEW URBAN COLONIZATION, at 
5 (Rowland Atkinson & Gary Bridge eds., 2005), available at http://www 
.amazon.com/dp/0415329SJ 5/refo,rdr_exCtmb. 
121. See generally, Kevin Litten, Baltimore office market slowly recovers, BAIT. Bus. J. 
Guly 5, 2013), http://www.bi7journals.com/baltimore/blog/real-estate/ 
2013/07 /bal tirnore-office-market-slowl y-recovers.htrnl?page=all. 
122. Jd. 
123. Hamor Point, EE&K ARCTIITECTS, http://www.eekarchitect~.com/portfolio/ 
l-waterfronts/26-harbor-point (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
124. See Lillcn, snpmnote 121; See generally, Myers, supra note 117. 
125. For example suppose that the break-even lease rate for newly constrncted 
unsubsidized Class-A commercial space is $25 a square foot. If the subSidy 
lowers construction costs by 20%, the break-even lease rate falls to $20. 
Further suppose that of the total lease rate, $5 represents unsubsidized real 
estate taxes. If, on top of construction subsidies, there is a 50% real estate 
tax abatement, the hreak-even lease rate falls to $17.50. For Baltimore this 
means brand new C1ass-A space for Class-B prices. See generally, Myers, supra 
note 124 and accompanying text. 
126. See Mark Reutter, Downtown opposition to Harbor Point T1Fcarries real weight, 
BALTIMORE. BREW (August 7, 2013, 2:18 PM), hups:/ /www.baltimorebrew 
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Fells Point is a gentrifying, largely residential neighborhood just 
east of Harbor PoinL 127 Its property owners will be impacted, if at all, 
one way, and its tenant" another. Fells Point property values may rise 
due to Harbor Point because people who work in Harbor Point and 
want to live nearby may opt for the chann of Fells Point over the new-
ness of Harbor Point. 128 If Fells Point property values go up, so will 
Fells Point rents. Fells Point property owners were supportive of Har-
bor Point because they stand to gain with little downside risk. Fells 
Point renters, however, organized in opposition.I~9 They fear being 
priced out of their homes. 130 
d. Politicians 
Politicians, elected and otherwise, always benefit from development 
subsidies. 131 They benefit financial1y by receiving campaign contribu-
tions, and by earning bragging rights ("See what bad things I fought 
to stop" or "See what good things I brought to my community"). Even 
when projects result in spectacular disappointment, the politicians 
that appl'oved them are apt to come up winners. Reelections are to-
morrow. Failures are realized years down the line, long after the ap-
proving politicians have moved on. 
Maryland's politics conformed to this scenario. In the Maryland 
House of Delegates, the vote on HB 613 was overwhelmingly in favor, 
with all opposition coming from Tea Party Republicans (whose seats 
127. 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
.C orn/20 13/08 I 07 / downtown -opposition -to-harbor-point-tif-carries-real-
weight/. 
Scott Calvert., 'Upscale" threatens gritty bars, THE BALTIMORE SUN (November 
14, 2004), http://artic1es.balLimoresun.com/2004-1 1-14/news/0411140101 
_ljells-whistling-oyster-miss-in:nc; See also, Becoming R~'ntrijied but still neat, 
TRlP;illvISOR, http://www.tripadvisoLcorn/ShowU serRcviewsog60811-d 1090 
74-rl95188.r:i9So Fell_s_Point-Baltimore_Maryland.html (reviewed Feb. 24, 
2104); See generally, Fells Point Out of Time, Interview by Kraig Greff with 
Vince Peranio, Fells Point Resident (Feb, 11, ~004), transcript available at 
http://www.historyatdsk.com/images/ fpooctranscripts/Vincc_Peranio_ 
021104. pdf. 
Greff, supra note 127. 
Reutter, supra at note 126. 
See supra text accompanying note 129; See also Greff, supra note 127. 
See generally ROBERT TRl£ST, THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSIDIES FOR COMMUNI'1~ 
DEVELOl'MENT: A PRIME.R, Smart Subsidy Community Development 10-20 
(Fed. Res. Rank of Boston & the Aspen Inst., July 201 1), available at Imps:/ 
Iwww.boSlonfed.org/commdev/smart-subsidy/ lO-triesLpdf; Brendan 
Greely, Why fuel Subsidies in Developing Nations Are an Economic Addiction, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWUK (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
bw / articles/20 14-03-13/why-fuel~subsidics-in-developing-nations-are-an-ec­
onomie-addiction; World Trade Report 2006: The Economics njSubsidies, WORJ.D 
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2006), https:1 /VtIWW.wto.org/english/res3/booksp_ 
e/anrep_e/world_tradejeport06_e.pdf; Global SUbsidies initiative: Subsidy 
Primer: Gh. 2 The JJlfectJ of Subsidies: The opportunity cost of subsidies, INTERNA· 
TIONAL INSTlTUTE FOR SUSTAINABL.E DEVELOPMENT, http://www.iisd.org/gsi/ 
effect~-subsidies (last visited Mar. \,2015). 
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are safe in the general election, but who were threatened with primary 
challenges had they dared to vote yes).1~2 The state Senate, which 
lacked political opposition, voted 46 to 1 in favor of the bill. 133 Balti-
more's mayor and city council president were Harbor Point's local 
champions; City Councilman Stokes led the opposition. 134 The politi-
cians received far more free press coverage in the weeks leading up to 
the project's approval than normally would have been the case. ISS 
Mayor Rawlings-Blake and Council President Young received bragging 
rights to the job-creating, downtown revitalization project. J 36 Council-
man Stokes received a $3 million pledge for affordable housing for his 
constituents.1!I7 
e. Taxpaying public 
The taxpaying public is the only m~or stakeholder in subsidized 
development whose vital interests include project performance. 131l 
For the other stakeholders, their gains or losses align with approval 
132. 
133. 
134. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
Alexander Pyles, House passes development financing bil4 The Daily Rec. (Mar. 
23, 2013), h up:/ / thedailyrecord.com/ 20 13/03/ 23/house-passes-develop-
ment-financing-bil1/; In the 2014 Maryland election only 5 of 47 elections 
for the slate Senate were competitive (where competitive means "the win-
ner got less than 55% of the vote~). For the House, 13 of 141 seats were 
competitive, see MD Stat.e Senate elections 2014, BALLQTOPEDIA (2014), http:// 
ball otped i a.org/ Maryla nd_State_Se nate_ el ection s,_20 14. 
Votes: MD HB613 2013 Ref!,Ular Session, LEGISC.AN, https:! /legiscan.com/ 
MD/votes/HB613/2013 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
Luke Broadwater, Critics, sulJparters clash ove'/' Harbor Point deal, THE BALTI-
MORE SUN (July 17, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-07-17/ 
news/bs-md-ci-harbor-poi nt-protest-20 130717 _l_harbor-poin t-su pporters-
clash-chairman-carl-stokes/2. 
Search for articles featuring Councilman Stokes about Harbor Point, 
COOGLE, http://www.google.com (search "Councilman Stokes" and "Har-
bor Point," then click the magnifying glass icon) (displaying the increased 
media attention on Councilman Stokes due to the controversy over Harbor 
Point). During June, July and August, 2013, Councilman Stokes was men-
tioned in 81 articles in The Baltimnre Sun. Of these, 11 were related to Har-
bor Point. 
See Max Weiss, Harbor Point clash: Project moving forward, despite controversy, 
BALTIMORE MAc. (Dec. 2013), http://www.baltimoremagazine.net/2013/ 
12/ I /20-even ts-of-20 13-harbor-point-proj ect-moving-forward-despite-
controversy. 
See Luke Broadwater, Harbor Point construction could begin next month, THE 
BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 9, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013.{l9-
09/ news/bs-md-ci-harbor-point-council-vote-20 130909_I_harbor-poin t -de-
velopment-group-jack-young-tax-increment-financing. 
Most subsidy stakeholders receive benefits from subsidies. Taxpayers pay 
for them. If the subsidy takes the form of a direct benefit to the developer 
- for example, when the city picks up the cost of the roads and other infra-
structure needed by a development - it is the taxpayers who in reality foot 
the bill. And if the subsidy takes the form of abated taxes, it is the taxpayers 
who must pay more to close the city's resultant revenue gap. See Mark Reut-
ter, Citizens are starting to question Harbor Point 11F subsidies, BALTIMORE BREW 
(Aug. 3, 2013 at 2:37PM), https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2013/08/03/ 
citizens-are-starti ng-to-q uestion-harbor-poi n t-tif-su bsidi es/ . 
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and not with performance.139 The truth of project performance, past 
or projected, is more likely to harm non-taxpayer stakeholders than it 
is to help them - fewer subsidies would be approved in the future - so 
their incentive is to obfuscate and obscure the truth. The taxpayers' 
advocates are their elected officials. Since the benefits for elected ofii-
cials and the benefits for their taxpaying constituents are not in sync 
when it comes to development subsidies, the personal interests of the 
public officials trump those of the taxpayers. 
The public debate that preceded Harbor Point's approval further 
illustrates my contention that no one is looking out for the tax-
payer. 14f1 The subsidies were criticized for being too generous to the 
developer,141 for spending too much money on impractical parks, 14~ 
for being environmentally unfriendly, 14~ for not reflecting "proper" 
priorities,144 and for being unfair to groups that were not privy to the 
spoils.14S What was absent from the entire discussion was any sugges-
tion that an investment of over $200 million of public money might be 
anything but good for taxpayers. 146 The Baltimore Sun, citing BDC 
analyses, came close but failed to connect the dots. 147 According to 
the BDC, Harbor Point would have returned 10.7% if there were no 
subsidies and 14% with the subsidies. 148 If the analysis that produced 
these numbers is correct, the return on the taxpayers' $200+ million 
Harbor Point investment will be zero. 149 Unless there are spillover 
139_ 
140. 
141. 
142. 
143. 
144. 
145. 
146. 
147. 
148. 
149. 
See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text. 
See Todd Krainin, Harbor Point and Baltimore's 'l'axpayer-Funded Edifice Com-
plex, REASON Gan- 2, 2014), httV/ /reason_com/reiL~ontv/2014/01/08/bal· 
timores-edifice-complex, 
Id. 
Neily, supra note 2. 
Timothy "Wheeler and Erin Cox, Harbor Point project stirs environrrll!ntal con-
cerns, THE BALTIMORF SUN (Aug. 31, 2013), 1w.p:/ /articles.ba1timoresun 
.com!20 13--08-31 / features/ bs·md·harbor-poi tlt-ch raIn ium· 
20 130831_1_harbor-poin Hoxie-chromium ·fells·poin t. 
Michael Fox and Rachel Kuder, Harbor Point and fair development', THE B.~L­
TIMORE SUN (Sept. 12, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013--09-
12/ news/bs-ed·harbor.poin t· 20 130912_1_harbor·poinHiHair·develop· 
ment-united-workers. 
Mark Reutter, ClnJ!;ymen seek $25 millionfrorn Harbor Point developer Jar "com· 
munity benefits", BALTIMORE BREW (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.baltimore 
brcw.com/20 131 08/05/ clergymen-request-25.milIion-from.harbor-point-
developer-f or·communi ty-henefits/. 
See supra notes 141-45. 
See supra notes 91, 14445. 
See supra note 9l. 
The total pr~jecL costs are projected at $1.027 billion. If all this were paid 
for by the developer, his return at 10.7% would equal $110 million. Balti-
more will be contributing $107 million via the TIF leaving $920 million t.o 
be supplied by the developer. At a 14% return on this investment., the de-
veloper's cash income will come to $129 million. This means that ongoing 
subsidies (lax abatements mostly) will lower operating costs by $19 million, 
the developer will get the $110 million he would have gotten had there 
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benefits that will augment the taxpayers' return on investment, Har-
bor Point could easily saddle them with a IOSS.150 
VI. Conclusion 
When it comes to public subsidies of private development, the tax-
paying public has not gotten, nor is it likely to get, the return on in-
vesttnent it was led to expect. 151 It has been, and likely will continue 
to be, misled by unsubstantiated "motherhood and apple pie" 
promises of jobs and lower taxes. 152 Rarely, if ever, will the taxpaying 
public receive an above-board accounting of cost'S incurred and value 
received when it comes to public subsidies of private development. 153 
Our system is designed in a way that makes this virtually inevitable. 
Too many inside interests benefit when projects are subsidized - the 
developers who shepherd the projects through, the organized labor 
that builds them, and, most of a1l, the elected officials and bureaucrats 
who use these projects to further their careers. 154 If the taxpayers that 
provide the subsidies were to get fair value for their money, it will be 
by happenstance and not by design.155 
VVhen it comes to Harbor Point, the treatment accorded Maryland's 
taxpayers may have been even worse than usual. Not only were they 
not provided an honest assessment of Harbor Point's costs and risks, 
but they were misled by the state's Pollyanna-like pronouncements 
and willful misdirection in support of subsidized development, sus-
tainable communities, and tax increment financing in general. 156 At 
both city and state levels, the people's representatives committed the 
people to courses of action that better serve the interests of those rep-
resentatives than the interests of their constituents. 157 
Is there anything that can be done to remedy this situation? With-
out major changes to our political system, the answer is no. As long as 
those entrusted with guarding taxpayers' interests - their elected and 
appointed officials - have interests that don't align iATith those of the 
taxpayers, the interests of the officials will take precedence. 15M We 
have put a fat kid in charge of the cookie jar. That there are no cook-
ies left for us is the obvious result. 
been no TIF, and the taxpayers will be lefL with no return on their invest-
ment, at least not for many years. See generally Lukewatcr, supra note 91. 
150. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Recall the ongoing taxpayer sub-
sidies needed by M&T Rank Stadium and Camden Yards. 
151. See supra notes 100-03, 114-29, 148 and accompanying text. 
152. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. 
153. See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. 
155. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
15fi. See supra notes 14045 and accompanying text. 
157. See suln-a notes 134-37 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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Table I 
10 Year Revenue Shortfall with 2% Annual Inflation - Without a TIF 
Year Revenue Expe ndi tures Shortfall 
I $ 1,000 $ 2,000 $ 1,000 
2 $ 1,020 $ 2,040 $ 1,020 
3 $ 1,040 $ 2,081 $ 1,040 
4 $ 1,061 $ 2,122 $ 1,06] 
5 $ 1,082 $ 2,165 $ 1,082 
6 $ 1,104 $ 2,208 $ 1,104 
7 $ 1,126 $ 2,252 $ 1,126 
8 $ 1,149 $ 2,297 $ 1,149 
9 $ 1,172 $ 2,343 $ 1,172 
10 $ 1,195 $ 2,390 $ 1,195 
Total Shortfall $ 10,950 
Table 2 
10 Year Revenue Shortfall with 2% Annual Inflation - With a TIF 
Year Revenue Expenditures Shortfall 
1 $ 1,000 $ 2,000 $ 1,000 
2 $ 1,000 $ 2,040 $ 1,040 
3 $ 1,000 $ 2,081 $ 1,081 
4 $ 1,000 $ 2,122 $ 1,122 
5 $ 1,000 $ 2,165 $ 1,165 
6 $ 1,000 $ 2,208 $ 1,208 
7 $ 1,000 $ 2,252 $ 1,252 
8 $ 1,000 $ 2,297 $ 1,297 
9 $ 1,000 $ 2,343 $ 1,343 
]0 $ 1,000 $ 2,390 $ ],390 
Total Shortfall $ 11,899 
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Table 3 
10 Year Revenue Shortfall with 2% Annual Inflation, Doubled Base-
line Service Burden & a TIF 
Year Revenue Expenditures Shortfall 
1 $ 1,000 $ 4,000 $ 3,000 
2 $ 1,000 $ 4,080 $ 3,080 
3 $ 1,000 $ 4,162 $ 3,162 
4 $ 1,000 $ 4,245 $ 3,245 
5 $ 1,000 $ 4,330 $ 3,330 
6 $ 1,000 $ 4,416 $ 3,416 
7 $ 1,000 $ 4,505 $ 3,505 
8 $ 1,000 $ 4,595 $ 3,595 
9 $ 1,000 $ 4,687 $ 3,687 
]0 $ 1,000 $ 4,780 $ 3,780 
Total Shortfall $ 33,799 
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APPENDIX I ~ THE NEIGHBORHOOD THAT SURROUNDS 
DRUID MILL 
